Paying the Toll To Be Class Member: The Impact of the American Pipe Doctrine on Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 by Denberg, Bryan
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 87 
Number 1 Volume 87, Winter 2013, Number 1 Article 7 
April 2014 
Paying the Toll To Be Class Member: The Impact of the American 
Pipe Doctrine on Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 
Bryan Denberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Denberg, Bryan (2013) "Paying the Toll To Be Class Member: The Impact of the American Pipe Doctrine on 
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 87 : No. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FINAL_DENBERG 12/11/2013 3:43 PM 
 
239 
PAYING THE TOLL TO BE CLASS MEMBER: 
THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PIPE 
DOCTRINE ON SECTION 13 OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
BRYAN DENBERG† 
INTRODUCTION 
In light of the rampant, disingenuous practices revealed 
within the financial industry over the past decade, the number of 
securities class action lawsuits filed has significantly increased.1  
Claims filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 
1933 most often take the form of class actions because of the 
minimal incentive a single claimant has to bring a suit on his or 
her own.2  The effects of these class action suits are severe and 
threaten the stability of our economy.3  Because of the costs and 
uncertainty associated with class action litigation of this 
magnitude, it is in a defendant’s best interest to settle, and large 
settlements are usually reached as a result.4 
A class member may pursue a number of different paths to 
maintain his or her rights.  As a class member: (1) one may allow 
the class action to represent his or her rights and be bound by 
the judgment rendered in the class action suit;5 (2) before or after 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., 2009, Indiana University-Bloomington. Thank you to 
Professor Robert Ruescher and Nick Allen for their guidance in writing this piece. I 
would also like to thank Professor Jeremy Weintraub for all of his support, patience, 
and assistance. Lastly, I would like to thank Professor Michael Perino for the 
integral role he played in my decision to write this Note. 
1 Jordan Milev et al., United States: Recent Trends in Securities Class Action 
Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review, MONDAQ (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/140610/Securities; see also U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM, 
ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM 5 (2008). 
2 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 1, at 3. 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 Id. at 6–7. 
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). 
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class certification is determined, one may opt out and bring an 
individual claim against the defendant;6 or (3) after class 
certification has been denied, one may intervene so as to have his 
or her perspectives on the matter heard.7  A class member that 
opts out is no longer a member of that class and will not be bound 
by any judgment or be entitled to any proceeds that may be 
achieved in the class action.8 
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) defines 
two time limits for which claims pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 
of the Act may be brought.9  The outermost limit prescribed is 
three years from when a “security [is] bona fide offered to the 
public, or [sold].”10  Different interpretations of Section 13’s effect 
have caused a split among courts.11  The circumstances that have 
caused inconsistent rulings are when a class action, alleging 
claims under Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act, had been 
commenced within the three-year period provided for in Section 
13; however, while the class action is pending and after the 
three-year repose period runs, a class member moves to 
intervene or brings a separate, individual claim against the same 
defendant.  Should the court grant the motion to intervene or 
permit the individual claim to be brought given that the action 
was commenced more than three years from the offering or sale 
of the security upon which the claim is based? 
Courts are split as to the answer.  Some courts have held 
that the filing of a class action suspends the running of the three-
year statute of repose until class certification has been denied or 
until a claimant opts out of the class.12  In contrast, other courts 
have held that Section 13’s statute of repose is an absolute bar to  
 
 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 23(d)(1)(B)(iii). 
8 See, e.g., Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006). 
10 Id. 
11 Compare Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Section 13 allows tolling for individual claims while a potential class action is 
awaiting certification), with Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 618, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 13 does not allow tolling for 
individual claims). 
12 Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168; Int’l Fund Mgmt. S.A. v. Citigroup Inc., 822 F. 
Supp. 2d 368, 380–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through 
Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 666–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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actions brought more than three years from the start of the 
repose period and that it may not be extended or suspended in 
any way.13 
This Note argues that the three-year statute of repose in 
Section 13 of the 1933 Act runs uninterrupted from the bona fide 
offering or sale of a security and operates as an absolute bar, 
extinguishing claimants’ rights to bring an action after the three-
year period ends.  Part I of this Note provides an overview of the 
early legislation on which the 1933 Act is based and surveys the 
events that led to the Act’s current form.  Thereafter Part I 
discusses four Supreme Court cases that courts are struggling to 
apply consistently in the context of claims governed by Section 
13.  Part II identifies the significance of how the doctrine 
established by the Supreme Court in American Pipe is 
characterized and the range of consequences the different 
classifications carry with respect to Section 13’s statute of repose.  
Part II also analyzes the conflicting interpretations of the 
doctrine articulated in American Pipe, which has led to the 
current split among courts.  Lastly, Part III argues that Section 
13’s statute of repose is not susceptible to what has become 
known as the American Pipe doctrine.  Part III maintains that 
regardless of whether or not the American Pipe doctrine is 
recognized as a tolling doctrine, Section 13’s statute of repose 
bars actions brought pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 that are 
initiated more than three years after the bona fide offering or 
sale of a security. 
I. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT 
This section provides a synopsis of the laws that helped 
shape the Securities Act of 1933 and summarizes the Supreme 
Court’s rulings that have influenced the split among courts.  Part 
I.A offers an overview of the early British and American laws 
upon which our country’s current federal securities laws are 
based.  Part I.B then excerpts the relevant provision of the 1933 
Act, as well as describes the events that led to the passage of the 
1933 Act, the reasons for its enactment, and the noteworthy  
 
 
13 In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482–83 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Footbridge Ltd. Trust, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 626–27. 
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amendments made to it.  Part I.C outlines the four Supreme 
Court cases that have influenced the courts’ inconsistent rulings 
regarding Section 13’s effect. 
A. British Legislation and the “Blue Sky” Laws 
The framework for the federal securities laws took its 
earliest form when Parliament passed the Companies Act in 1844 
(“1844 Act”).14  At the time, the 1844 Act was the first modern 
prospectus requirement enforced by a government body upon 
corporations.15  The 1844 Act “introduced the principle of 
mandatory disclosure through the registration of prospectuses 
inviting subscriptions to corporate shares,” but it was not until 
the Companies Act of 1867 that prospectus disclosures had to 
conform with a detailed prescription.16  These laws held corporate 
directors and promoters civilly liable for falsities in a 
prospectus.17 
Securities regulation in the United States first developed at 
the state level.18  Although Massachusetts passed a statute in 
1852 regulating the stock and bond issues within the railroad 
industry,19 Kansas is credited with passing the first general 
securities law in 1911, when the state implemented a 
comprehensive licensing system.20  The Kansas statute required 
 
14 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 2–3 (6th 
ed. 2011). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 3. 
17 Id. (holding actors civilly liable for “untrue statements in the prospectus 
without proof of scienter”); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 
n.12 (1976) (Scienter denotes “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”). 
18 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 48 (4th ed. 
2006). 
19 Id. at 48–49 (“ ‘No railroad company . . . shall begin to build its road until a 
certificate shall have been filed . . . stating that all of the stock named in its charter 
has been subscribed for by responsible parties, and that twenty per cent of the par 
value of each and every share of the stock thereof has been actually paid into the 
treasury of the company.’ ” (quoting 1852 Mass. Acts 208)). 
20 Id. at 53 (That is where “the term blue sky law first came into general use to 
describe legislation aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky 
in fee simple.’ ”); id. at 53 n.20 (first alteration in original) (“[I]f said bank 
commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or association, charter, 
constitution and by-laws, plan of business or proposed contract, contain any 
provision that is unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of 
contributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment 
company . . . does not intend to do a fair and honest business . . . he shall notify such 
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the registration of securities and securities salesmen, the filing of 
semi-annual reports, bookkeeping standards—subject to 
inspection, and standards for the denial of permits to sell 
securities.21  Kansas’s model led to the passage of “blue sky” laws, 
state implemented prospectus requirements, of one kind or 
another in almost every state.22 
B. The Securities Act of 1933 
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash,23 Congress 
established the first federal regulation of securities in the United 
States when it passed the Securities Act of 1933.24  The bill was 
drafted and signed into law after President Roosevelt wrote a 
message to Congress calling for legislation requiring full 
disclosure to the public of material information relevant to 
securities to be sold.25  The 1933 Act, often termed “the truth-in-
securities act,”26 became effective in May 1933 and put in place a 
mandatory corporate disclosure system.27  In substance, the Act 
provided for “the filing of a registration statement and the use of 
 
investment company in writing of his findings, and it shall be unlawful for such 
company to do any further business in this state.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
21 Id. at 53. 
22 Id. at 54. 
23 See id. at 255. 
24 See id. at 256–57. 
25 Id. at 255–56. 
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of 
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce. 
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained 
severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of 
many persons and corporations selling securities. 
. . . [T]he Federal Government cannot and should not take any action 
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued 
securities are sound . . . . There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist 
that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be 
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially 
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying 
public. 
. . . . 
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the 
least possible interference to honest business. 
Id. at 266–67 (quoting President Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Mar. 29, 1933)). 
26 Id. at 268. 
27 See id. at 269. “The term mandatory corporate disclosure system refers to the 
information firms must disseminate when issuing new securities under the 
Securities Act of 1933.” Id. at 269 n.21 (alteration in original). 
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a prospectus in connection with the public offering of securities, 
and subjected the issuer and those connected with the offering to 
civil and criminal liabilities in the event of material 
misstatements or omissions.”28 
In 1934, Congress made two significant modifications to the 
1933 Act.  First, it reduced the repose period for Section 13’s 
statute of repose from ten years to three years.29  Second, 
Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”)30 and charged it with the responsibility to: (1) “interpret 
federal securities laws”; (2) “issue new rules and amend existing 
rules”; (3) “oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, 
investment advisers, and ratings agencies”; (4) “oversee private 
regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting, and 
auditing fields”; and (5) “coordinate U.S. securities regulation 
with federal, state, and foreign authorities.”31 
Section 13, entitled “Limitation of [A]ctions,” is a timing 
provision that imposes a limitation on the time frame within 
which a claim must be filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.32  
By enacting Section 13, lawmakers created a “two-tiered 
limitations period—a one-year statute of limitations framed by a 
three-year statute of repose.”33  Section 13 reads, as amended: 
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created 
under section [11] or [12(a)(2)] of this title unless brought 
within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or 
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce 
a liability created under section [12(a)(1)] of this title, unless 
brought within one year after the violation upon which it is 
based.  In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a 
liability created under section [11] or [12(a)(1)] of this title more  
 
 
28 Id. at 262. 
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006). 
30 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
31 SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last modified Mar. 8, 2013). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 77m. Sections 11 and 12 “impose civil liability for false 
representations made in a registration statement, prospectus or oral communication 
used in connection with the offer or sale of a security.” Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2006). 
33 Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77m). 
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than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the 
public, or under section [12(a)(2)] of this title more than three 
years after the sale.34 
Statutes of limitations create an affirmative defense for 
defendants when a plaintiff fails “to bring suit within a specified 
period of time after his cause of action accrued, often subject to 
tolling principles.”35  In contrast, statutes of repose “affect the 
availability of the underlying right:  That right is no longer 
available on the expiration of the specified period of time.”36  
Accordingly, statutes of limitations are procedural mechanisms 
that limit the remedy available for causes of action.37  
Dissimilarly, a statute of repose “creates a substantive right [for 
defendants] to be free from liability after a legislatively-
determined period of time.”38 
C. The Supreme Court’s Influential Rulings 
The differing interpretations and applications of the 
following four cases have fueled the current debate about the 
effect of Section 13’s statute of repose.  The Supreme Court, in its 
landmark decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 
established that the commencement of a class action tolls the 
running of a relevant statute of limitations for class members 
who intervene after class status is denied.39  The Court 
subsequently broadened the applicability of American Pipe’s 
doctrine, holding that the commencement of a class action tolls 
the running of a statute of limitations for class members who opt 
out of a class before or after class certification is determined.40  
The Supreme Court also held in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & 
 
34 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
35 Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
36 P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.1, 4–5 (1991)). For a further 
discussion of the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 
see infra Part III.B.2. 
37 First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 
862, 865 (4th Cir. 1989). 
38 Id. at 866; see also P. Stolz, 355 F.3d at 102 (“Unlike a statute of limitations, a 
statute of repose is not a limitation of a plaintiff’s remedy, but rather defines the 
right involved in terms of the time allowed to bring suit.” (emphasis added)). 
39 414 U.S. 538, 552–53 (1974). 
40 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983); Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 181–82 (1974). 
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Petigrow v. Gilbertson, however, that equitable tolling is 
inconsistent with statutes of repose.41  Consequently, courts 
struggle to consistently apply these decisions in situations where 
a class action raising claims pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 is 
commenced before the three-year statute of repose has run and a 
class member later files an individual suit or intervenes after the 
three-year repose period ends. 
In January 1974, the Supreme Court in American Pipe 
established a doctrine that in effect tolls a statute of 
limitations.42  In American Pipe, the respondents moved to 
intervene in an antitrust class action lawsuit to which they had 
been unnamed purported class members after the named 
plaintiff failed to obtain class certification.43  At the time 
respondents moved to intervene, the one-year statute of 
limitations period had extinguished.44  The Court held, in the 
statute of limitations’ context, that “the commencement of the 
original class suit tolls the running of the [relevant] statute [of 
limitations] for all purported members of the class who make 
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriate for class action status.”45  Timely motions, 
according to the Court, were those motions that were brought 
within the tolled statute of limitations period.46  The Court 
reasoned that “the rule most consistent with federal class action 
procedure must be that the commencement of a class action 
suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted 
members of the class who would have been parties had the suit 
been permitted to continue as a class action.”47 
Within months of its decision in American Pipe, the Supreme 
Court handed down two rulings extending the reach of its 
recently recited doctrine.  In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the 
Supreme Court stated that the doctrine described in American 
Pipe permitted class members to opt out of a certified class and 
bring their own individual suit even when the statute of 
 
41 See 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a) 
(2006), as recognized in Greenfield v. Shuck, 856 F. Supp. 705 (D. Mass. 1994)). 
42 See generally Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552–53 (ruling made in the context of an 
antitrust suit). 
43 Id. at 543–44. 
44 Id. at 544. 
45 Id. at 553. 
46 See id. at 552–53. 
47 Id. at 554. 
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limitations has run out.48  The Court reasoned that its decision in 
American Pipe “established that commencement of a class action 
tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the 
class.”49 
Thereafter, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, the 
Supreme Court further extended the American Pipe doctrine to 
include tolling for putative class members who seek to file 
independent actions before certification of a class is determined.50  
The Court reasoned that the statute of limitations remains tolled 
for all members of the putative class until class certification is 
denied.51  The Court again based its reasoning on a broad reading 
of the principle explained in American Pipe, that the filing of a 
class action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the 
class.52  Furthermore, the Court explained that not permitting 
tolling would give putative class members incentive to file 
individual actions prior to the expiration of the limitations period 
and that this would result in “a needless multiplicity of actions—
precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
and the tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid.”53 
More recently in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow 
v. Gilberston (“Lampf”), the Supreme Court confirmed an integral 
feature of statutes of repose.54  In Lampf, the plaintiff-
respondents’ complaint alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.55  Claims filed 
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “must be commenced 
within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation and within three years after such violation.”56  The 
plaintiff-respondents contended that both the one-year statute of 
limitations period and the three-year statute of repose period 
governing the Section 10(b) claims were subject to the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.57  The Court, however, held that equitable 
 
48 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974). 
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983). 
51 Id. at 354. 
52 Id. at 350. 
53 Id. at 351. 
54 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilberston, 501 U.S. 350 
(1991), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a) (2006), as recognized in 
Greenfield v. Shuck, 856 F. Supp. 705 (D. Mass. 1994)). 
55 Id. at 353. 
56 Id. at 364. 
57 Id. at 363. 
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tolling principles did not apply to the three-year repose period.58  
The Court reasoned that the purpose of the three-year limitation 
is “clearly to serve as a cutoff,” and that the “equitable tolling 
doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the 1-and-3-year 
structure,”59 an identical structure to the one- to three-year 
structure in Section 13 of the 1933 Act. 
II. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN PIPE AND 
SECTION 13 
This section begins by discussing the different 
characterizations of the American Pipe doctrine and why the 
label placed on the doctrine matters.  Part II.B then surveys the 
line of cases that have held the American Pipe doctrine to be 
applicable to Section 13’s statute of repose and the rationale 
behind the rulings.  Part II.C reviews the line of cases that held 
the American Pipe doctrine to be incompatible with Section 13’s 
statute of repose and disallow any extension of the three-year 
time limit prescribed. 
A. The Significance of How American Pipe Is Characterized 
How the Supreme Court’s holdings are interpreted and 
classified is central to analyzing the effect of Section 13’s statutes 
of repose.  The American Pipe doctrine has been characterized as: 
(1) equitable tolling, (2) legal tolling, and (3) not a tolling doctrine 
at all.60  A court’s adoption of one of these three theories 
significantly impacts its determination of whether actions can be 
brought, for any reason, after Section 13’s three-year repose 
period has run. 
Tolling is considered “legal,” or “statutory,” when a court’s 
power to toll is provided for in an appropriate statutory source 
and can properly be applied to the limitations period.61  An 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. Furthermore, “ ‘the inclusion of the three-year period can have no 
significance in this context other than to impose an outside limit.’ ” Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 
Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 288 (1989)). 
60 Compare Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 
618, 624–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), with In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through 
Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 666–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and Joseph v. 
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000). 
61 See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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example of this form of tolling is found in the statutory provision 
governing post-conviction review of judgments.62  The statute 
explicitly states that the time during which a properly filed 
application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is 
pending “shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 
under this subsection.”63 
Tolling is “equitable” when a tolling doctrine is judicially 
created and deemed appropriate due to equitable considerations 
contemplated by the court.64  Equitable tolling is appropriate only 
when it effectuates the policies underlying the statute and the 
purposes underlying the limitations period.65  For example, 
equitable tolling has been applied to toll a statute of limitations 
in the Railway Labor Act while lengthy administrative 
proceedings were pending.66 
It is less clear, however, what impact the American Pipe 
doctrine has on Section 13’s statute of repose when it is not 
considered to be a tolling doctrine, but rather a mechanism 
whereby the filing of a class action “effectively” commences an 
action for all class members.  Tolling is said to occur when, by 
operation of law, plaintiffs are excused from commencing a suit 
to enforce their rights within a prescribed time frame because of 
some event that the law recognizes as sufficient to extend the 
prescribed deadline.67  Since American Pipe held that the “filing 
of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all 
members of the class as subsequently determined” and pursuant 
to Rule 23 a class action is “a truly representative suit,”68 class  
 
 
 
62 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006). 
63 Id. 
64 See Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 626. 
65 Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1965); Albano v. Shea 
Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Arivella v. Lucent 
Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)). 
66 See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 
342, 348–49 (1944). 
67 Brief for W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 4–5, Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 11–1158 (2d Cir. July 6, 
2011) (describing the discovery rule as a classic example of tolling, as well as 
statutes that relieve minors of their obligation to file suit until they reach the age of 
majority and the federal habeas statutes that excuse state prisoners from filing for 
habeas relief within the prescribed one-year deadlines while that prisoner sought an 
alternative remedy in state court that might moot the habeas claim). 
68 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (emphasis added). 
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members need not be excused from commencing an individual 
suit for their claims within the prescribed time limit because 
they have already commenced suit by operation of law. 
B. Courts That Held American Pipe Permits Actions Beyond the 
Three-Year Statute of Repose 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is 
the only appellate court to address the issue of whether the 
three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act is 
subject to the American Pipe doctrine.69  In Joseph v. Wiles, the 
court had to determine whether the plaintiff’s Section 11 claim 
filed pursuant to the 1933 Act, which was filed almost three 
months after the repose period ran out, was timely.70  The 
plaintiff argued that either a class action complaint previously 
filed in California state court or a class action complaint filed in 
Colorado’s federal district court tolled the repose period for his 
Section 11 claim.71  The defendants relied on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lampf to argue that equitable tolling did not apply to 
statutes of repose.72 
The court held that the repose period for the plaintiffs’ 
Section 11 claim had not extinguished because the filing of the 
federal class action complaint commenced an action that was 
truly representative of the plaintiff.73  Therefore, the court 
concluded, the plaintiff’s Section 11 claim was timely filed within 
the tolled repose period.74  The court gave three reasons for its 
conclusion.  First, the court concluded that the type of tolling the 
plaintiff sought was “legal rather than equitable in nature” 
because the claimant had not filed a defective pleading during 
the statutory period or been tricked into missing the filing 
deadline by his adversary’s misconduct.75  The court reasoned 
that legal tolling ensues any time an action is commenced and 
class certification is pending.76  Second, the court reasoned that 
 
69 See generally Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). 
70 Id. at 1166. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1168. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1166. 
76 Id. at 1166–67 (“[T]olling [is] no longer appropriate after [the] court ruled 
definitively to deny class certification.”). The court goes on to proffer that the 
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“[t]olling the limitations period for class members while class 
certification is pending serves the purposes of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions.”77   Rule 
23 “encourages judicial economy by eliminating the need for 
potential class members to file individual claims” and the 
purpose of Rule 23 would be diminished if class members were 
forced to file their own claims to ensure their ability to maintain 
their rights.78  Third, the court reasoned that tolling the statute 
of repose while class certification was pending did not 
“compromise the purpose[] of statutes of . . . repose” because the 
plaintiff had already been a party to an action against these 
defendants since the class action was commenced. 79  The purpose 
of statutes of repose, the court stated, is to “demarcate a period of 
time within which a plaintiff must bring claims or else the 
defendant’s liability is extinguished.”80  Since a truly 
representative claim was commenced, as the Supreme Court 
alluded to in dicta, the American Pipe doctrine “in a 
sense . . . does not involve ‘tolling’ at all.”81 
Two cases recently decided in the Southern District of New 
York also held that the American Pipe doctrine applied to Section 
13’s statute of repose and permitted individual claims to be 
brought after the three-year repose period had run.  In In re 
Morgan Stanley, the court stated that “the applicability of the 
American Pipe rule to [Section 13’s] statute of repose here hinges 
on whether its tolling principle is equitable or legal in nature,” 
and the court found “more persuasive the view . . . that American 
Pipe . . . ‘is a species of legal tolling, in that it is derived from a 
statutory source, in this case Rule 23.’ ”82  The court reasoned 
that the American Pipe doctrine is based on the “ ‘notion that 
 
Supreme Court addressed this particular type of tolling in American Pipe. Id. at 
1167. 
77 Id. at 1167. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1168. 
81 See id. (explaining that this doctrine may not be “tolling” because the plaintiff 
“has effectively been a party to an action against these defendants since” a class 
action brought on his behalf was requested but not yet denied). 
82 In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 
2d 650, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 
164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009)); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074(a) (2006) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s power to promulgate procedural rules and the effectiveness of rules 
absent contrary legislative action). 
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class members are treated as parties to the class action’ and that, 
‘[b]ecause members of the asserted class are treated for 
limitations purposes as having instituted their own 
actions . . . the limitations period does not run against them’ ” 
until class certification is determined.83  The court also explained 
that tolling Section 13’s statute of repose is consistent with Rule 
23’s goals of efficiency and judicial economy, and therefore 
“consonant with the legislative scheme.”84  The court expressed 
that class members would be induced to file motions to secure 
their claims because of the length of the certification process, the 
risk of certification denial, and the fact that evidence of the 
offensive conduct could take years to come to light.85 
The court in International Fund Management S.A. v. 
Citigroup Inc. also held that the American Pipe doctrine applied 
to Section 13’s statute of repose.86  The court had to decide 
whether the pendency of a class action that raised the same 
claims the plaintiffs contended in their individual suits extended 
Section 13’s repose period by way of the American Pipe doctrine.87  
The court held that tolling was available with respect to the 
statute of repose not only for the same reasons enumerated 
above, but added that the plain language of the statute itself did 
not bar the application of tolling.88  The court reasoned that 
Section 13’s statute of repose and statute of limitations are 
written in comparable language, and since the statute of 
limitations is subject to the American Pipe doctrine, the statute 
of repose shall be as well.89  Moreover, in dicta, the court insisted 
that the statute of limitations in question in American Pipe “was 
more emphatically absolute, providing that ‘any action to enforce 
any cause of action [under the antitrust laws] shall be forever 
barred unless commenced’ within the limitations period.”90   
 
 
 
83 Morgan Stanley, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (alterations in original) (quoting In re 
Worldcom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
84 See id. at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 Id. 
86 See Int’l Fund Mgmt. S.A. v. Citigroup Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 380–81. 
89 Id. at 381; see also 15 U.S.C § 77m (2006). 
90 Int’l Fund Mgmt., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, 16(b)). 
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Therefore, the court reasoned that if American Pipe was applied 
to a statutory time limitation that involved more forceful 
language than Section 13, it should apply to Section 13 itself.91 
C. Court’s That Held American Pipe Has No Application Within 
Section 13’s Statute of Repose 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, however, has rendered inconsistent judgments on the 
issue.  The same court that found tolling appropriate in In Re 
Morgan Stanley and International Fund has, on two occasions, 
articulated different interpretations of Section 13 with respect to 
American Pipe.92  In Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide 
Financial Corp., the plaintiffs sought to avoid the absolute effect 
of the three-year statute of repose and argued that the repose 
period was tolled pursuant to American Pipe.93  The court, 
however, held that the “American Pipe tolling does not apply to 
[Section 13’s] statute of repose.”94  The court announced two 
reasons for its decision.  First the application of American Pipe 
violated the plain language of Section 13.95  The court stated that 
“[g]iving the words ‘[i]n no event’ their ordinary meaning 
precludes the application of American Pipe.”96  The second, and 
more extensive, reason set forth by the court was that American 
Pipe tolling is equitable tolling and statutes of repose are not 
subject to equitable tolling doctrines.97  The court reasoned that 
not only is “tolling . . . not [explicitly] provided for in the text of 
the [1933] Act or any governing statute” but “[i]n fashioning the 
tolling rule, the [American Pipe] Court [acknowledged that] 
‘ . . . recognizing judicial power to toll statutes of limitation in 
federal courts’ ” is not a new phenomenon.98  Furthermore, the 
 
91 Id. at 381–82. 
92 Compare In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 
F. Supp. 2d 650, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and Int’l Fund Mgmt., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 382, 
with Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), and In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 
482–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
93 Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C § 77m (2006)). 
97 Id. at 624–26. 
98 Id. at 626 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974)). 
“American Pipe tolling is a judicially-created rule premised on ‘traditional equitable 
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court identified that nowhere in American Pipe did the Supreme 
Court read Rule 23’s text as explicitly creating a class action 
tolling rule and therefore concluded that it must be an equitable 
doctrine.99 
Thereafter, the court in In re Lehman Brothers Securities 
and ERISA Litigation found Footbridge persuasive and similarly 
held that the statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act was 
not tolled by the pendency of class actions.100  The court 
concluded that American Pipe is an equitable tolling doctrine and 
focused its analysis on the differences between statutes of 
limitation and statutes of repose.101  The court noted that 
American Pipe was a case about a statute of limitations, not a 
statute of repose, and unlike statutes of repose, courts may toll 
statutes of limitations in appropriate circumstances.102 
III. SECTION 13’S STATUTE OF REPOSE BARS ALL ACTIONS 
BROUGHT AFTER THE UNINTERRUPTED THREE-YEAR REPOSE 
PERIOD RUNS 
A definitive determination of the effect of Section 13’s statute 
of repose is needed to alleviate the split among courts and the 
uncertainty of perpetual claims that businesses face.  Part III 
explains why treating Section 13’s three-year statute of repose as 
an absolute bar, not subject to any suspension by way of the 
American Pipe doctrine, is the accurate interpretation of the 
statute as it is written.  Part III.A analyzes Section 13 under the 
assumption that the American Pipe doctrine is a tolling doctrine.  
Part III.B then analyzes Section 13 under the assumption that 
the American Pipe doctrine is something other than a tolling 
doctrine.  Analyzing the American Pipe doctrine both as a tolling 
doctrine and as something other than a tolling doctrine results in 
the same conclusion:  Section 13’s statute of repose cannot be 
extended by application of the American Pipe doctrine. 
 
considerations’ of fairness, judicial economy and needless multiplicity of lawsuits.” 
Id. (quoting Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
99 See id. 
100 In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
101 See id. at 482. 
102 Id. at 482–83. “That decision, however, spoke only of tolling statutes of 
limitations—something courts may do in appropriate circumstances. When it comes 
to statutes of repose, however, the relevant policies are those of Congress rather 
than any that courts might think preferable.” Id. at 483. 
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A. American Pipe’s Effect as a Tolling Doctrine upon Section 
13’s Statute of Repose 
This section confirms that if the doctrine announced by the 
court in American Pipe is a tolling doctrine, it is a form of 
equitable tolling and therefore inconsistent with Section 13’s 
statute of repose.  This section then explains that even if the 
American Pipe doctrine is considered to be legal tolling, Section 
13’s statute of repose bars claims brought after the uninterrupted 
three-year repose period ends. 
1. If American Pipe Is a Form of Tolling, It Is Equitable and 
Inconsistent with Section 13’s Statute of Repose 
If considered to be a tolling doctrine at all, the American Pipe 
doctrine is equitable and not legal tolling.  The Supreme Court 
itself has unequivocally referred to American Pipe’s doctrine as a 
form of equitable tolling.  There is no evidence more conclusive 
than the Supreme Court’s characterization of its own creation.  
For example, in Young v. United States, the Supreme Court cited 
American Pipe for the proposition that limitations periods are 
usually subject to equitable tolling unless tolling is inconsistent 
with the text of the statute.103  And in Irwin v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, the Supreme Court cited American Pipe for the 
assertion that the Supreme Court has allowed equitable tolling 
in situations where defective pleadings are filed during the 
statutory periods.104 
In keeping with Supreme Court precedent, three federal 
circuit courts—the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits—have also 
referenced American Pipe as an equitable tolling doctrine.  For 
example, in Veltri v. Building Services 32B-J Pension Fund, the 
Second Circuit cited American Pipe as an example of equitable 
tolling,105 and in Bridges v. Department of Maryland State Police, 
the Fourth Circuit stated that the “American Pipe/Crown, Cork 
& Seal equitable tolling rule is a limited exception.”106  Also, in 
Youngblood v. Dalzell, the Sixth Circuit alluded to the plaintiff’s 
failure to discuss whether the relevant limitations period was 
 
103 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002). 
104 Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). 
105 Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322–23 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
106 Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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subject to equitable tolling under American Pipe precedent.107  
The Second Circuit has even explicitly referred to tolling based 
on the pendency of a class action, exactly the situation that the 
American Pipe court was confronted with, as equitable tolling.108 
Furthermore, in American Pipe, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that it alone possessed the power to toll statutes of 
limitations in federal court.109  In doing so, the Court declared 
that the American Pipe doctrine was promulgated by way of its 
discretion to do so and not as a result of an express grant 
provided for in the statute.110  Therefore, the American Pipe 
doctrine is effectuated by use of judicial power alone and not by 
way of power conferred on the court by the text of a relevant 
statute.  Accordingly, it must be a form of equitable tolling. 
Moreover, the American Pipe rule was premised on equitable 
considerations of fairness and judicial economy.111  The Court 
concluded that, although a federal statute provides for 
substantive liability and defines a time period within which a 
suit must be brought, the federal courts alone have the power to 
toll in circumstances where tolling would not be inconsistent 
with the legislative purpose.112  For the reasons stated above, if 
the American Pipe rule is deemed a tolling doctrine, it is an 
equitable one.  Since equitable tolling principles are inconsistent 
with the one- to three-year structure, the American Pipe doctrine 
may not be validly applied to Section 13’s statute of repose. 
2. Even If American Pipe Is Considered Legal Tolling, It Does 
Not Effect Section 13’s Statute of Repose 
When Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, it granted 
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of procedure, 
subject to congressional review.113  A federal rule, the Supreme 
Court stated, is permissible if it regulates the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law,114 but 
 
107 Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 959 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991). 
108 See Casey v. Merck & Co., 653 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2011). 
109 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974). 
110 See id. at 558–59. 
111 See id. at 550–54; Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537–38 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
112 See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 559. 
113 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
114 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
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it may not “change [a] plaintiffs’ separate entitlements to relief 
nor abridge defendants’ rights.”115  The theory that the American 
Pipe doctrine is a form of legal tolling rests on the notion that the 
Supreme Court’s power to “toll” the statute of limitations in 
American Pipe is derived from Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.116  By holding that pursuant to Rule 23 the 
commencement of a class action tolls the running of an applicable 
statute of limitations for class members, the Supreme Court is 
believed to have promulgated the rule known as the American 
Pipe doctrine from a statutory source, thereby making it a legal 
tolling doctrine. 
But even if the American Pipe doctrine is considered a form 
of “legal tolling,” a statute of repose’s substantive character 
precludes the American Pipe doctrine from applying to Section 13 
because rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, such as the 
American Pipe doctrine, cannot alter substantive rights granted 
by Congress.  Since statutes of limitations operate as a 
procedural mechanism and regulate the time at which an 
affirmative defense to a claim may be raised, the Rules Enabling 
Act permits tolling them.117  On the other hand, statutes of repose 
grant a substantive right, which cannot be curtailed by a rule 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and tolling them pursuant to 
the American Pipe doctrine is therefore prohibited.118  Congress 
enacts a statute of repose with the intention that the time period 
prescribed not be modified in the absence of further legislative 
action. 
 
 
115 Id. at 408; cf. id. (holding that a federal rule may not “alter[] [substantive] 
rights themselves”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
117 P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that since a statute of limitation is procedural and a limit to plaintiff’s 
remedy, it may be subject to “various forms of tolling” (quoting CORMAN, supra note 
36)). 
118 Id. (clarifying that statutes of repose cannot be tolled because they are 
substantive and “affect the availability of the underlying right.” (quoting CORMAN, 
supra note 36)); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) 
(American Pipe tolling of statutes of repose would “ ‘abridge, enlarge or 
modify . . . substantive right[s],’ ” which is exactly what the Rules Enabling Act 
prohibits (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))); see also Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 
254 P.3d 360, 366 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (concluding that American Pipe’s judicially 
created tolling rule could not “alter the substantive effect of a statute of repose”). 
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B. Principles of Statutory Interpretation Indicate That Section 
13’s Statute of Repose Is an Absolute Bar 
This section confirms Section 13’s absolute effect even under 
the notion that the doctrine articulated by the Court in American 
Pipe is something distinguishable from a tolling doctrine 
altogether.  Principles of statutory interpretation indicate that 
Section 13’s statute of repose operates as an absolute bar to both 
individual claims and motions to intervene brought more than 
three years after the date the security in question is sold.  An 
analysis of the following demonstrates why the three-year limit 
serves to extinguish claims once reached: (1) the statute’s plain 
language; (2) the congressional intent behind enacting the 
statutory provision; (3) the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
own interpretation of the provision; and (4) the public policy 
issues surrounding the debate. 
1. Section 13’s Plain Language Indicates That the Statute of 
Repose Is an Absolute Bar and That There Are No 
Exceptions 
The American Pipe doctrine and the Court’s rationale for its 
ruling are incompatible with Section 13’s statute of repose 
because the application of that doctrine is unambiguously 
prohibited by the express language of the provision and the rules 
governing civil procedure.  Analysis of Section 13’s text pursuant 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports the conclusion 
that the American Pipe doctrine cannot modify the statute’s 
three-year repose period.  The Court in American Pipe held that 
a timely class action complaint commences the action for all 
members of the subsequently determined class.119 
But the filing of a class action only commences that 
particular action against the defendant for all class members, not 
all actions that class members may subsequently bring.  To 
illustrate this point, consider the statute’s text under the two 
situations that call into question the statute of repose’s absolute 
nature: (1) when a class member seeks to bring a separate, 
individual suit, and (2) when a class member seeks to intervene 
in the class action.  Section 13 states “[i]n no event shall any such 
action be brought to enforce a liability . . . more than three years” 
 
119 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S 538, 550 (1974). 
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after the bona fide offering or sale of a security.120  An action at 
law is any judicial proceeding in which rights are determined.121  
Therefore, since both an individual claim and motion to intervene 
require judicial proceedings to determine the rights requested, 
they constitute an action.  An action is brought when the action 
is commenced.122  To commence an action is to demand something 
by institution of process in a court of justice.123  The reason for 
which a particular action is brought is immaterial; the statute 
says “[i]n no event shall any.”124 
According to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”), “[t]here is one form of action—the civil action.”125  Rule 
3 states that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint.126  In the context of an individual suit, claimants, 
regardless of their membership in the class action suit previously 
filed on their behalf, must file a new, separate complaint.  As per 
Rule 3 of the FRCP, a civil action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint, and as per Rule 2 of the FRCP, the only form of action 
is a civil action.127  Therefore, by filing a separate complaint 
pursuant to Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act more than three 
years from the sale of a security, a claimant is attempting to 
commence an action beyond the three-year limitation prescribed 
by the statute of repose, conduct which is strictly prohibited by 
the plain language of the provision.128 
Rule 24 of the FRCP governs intervention and subsection (c) 
states that “[a] motion to intervene . . . must state the grounds 
for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading.”129  In turn, 
Rule 7 lists the only pleadings that are permitted in federal 
courts and includes only forms of complaints and answers to 
complaints.130  So, per the FRCP, for class members to intervene 
they must submit a pleading to the court, which can only be in 
the form of a complaint if it is not an answer or reply to a 
 
120 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (emphasis added). 
121 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 33 (9th ed. 2009). 
122 See Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 163 (1883). 
123 What is Commence?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.thelawdictionary.org/ 
commence/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
124 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
126 Id. at 3. 
127 Id. at 2, 3. 
128 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c) (emphasis added). 
130 Id. at 7(a). 
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previously filed complaint.131  A motion to intervene, however, 
cannot possibly take form as an answer or reply to a prior 
complaint.132  Thus, since a claimant seeking to intervene must 
file a complaint and a complaint commences a civil action, a 
claimant seeking to intervene more than three years from the 
sale of the security upon which the class action is based is 
effectively bringing an action and is acting in direct 
contravention of the express language of the statute. 
Instances where a court permits a plaintiff to submit an 
“Amended Complaint” pose no further difficulty to this rationale.  
Rule 15 of the FRCP governs amended and supplemental 
pleadings.133  Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction 
should adhere to state rules governing the commencement of a 
suit, while the FRCP governs the commencement of a suit where 
federal courts face questions of federal law.134  As per Rule 15, an 
amended complaint “commences” a new action if it does not 
relate back to the original pleading.135 
Courts that have confronted this issue have only paid 
attention to Rule 23 of the FRCP, disregarding the other relevant 
and applicable provisions found within the FRCP.  Those who 
believe that Section 13’s statute of repose does not prohibit 
motions to intervene or individual suits after the three-year 
period has run argue that, according to American Pipe, the filing 
of a timely class action complaint effectively commences the 
action for all members of the subsequently determined class and 
therefore the obligation to bring an action within the three-year 
period prescribed by the statute of repose is satisfied when the 
class action is filed.136  This justification, however, disregards 
relevant rules of civil procedure and ignores the statute’s text. 
 
 
 
 
131 Id. at 24, 7(a). 
132 Id. at 24. 
133 Id. at 15. 
134 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751–53 (1980); Larsen v. 
Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2000). 
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
136 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550–53 (1974). 
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Furthermore, the 1933 Act’s plain language cannot be 
ignored so that remedial purposes can be served.137  Remedial 
goals are necessarily considered in enacting the federal securities 
laws138 and “it is proper for a court to consider . . . policy 
considerations in construing terms in [the federal securities] 
Acts.”139  Courts, however, cannot disregard the actual language 
of a statute in its analysis.140  While the 1933 Act does provide 
civil remedies for violations, the remedial goals of the Act are not 
a proper basis for a broader interpretation of Section 13 than 
that allowed for by its language. 
Statutory analysis begins with the plain meaning of a law’s 
text, and since the language “[i]n no event shall any such action 
be brought”141 is unambiguous, the scrutiny should end there.142  
Section 13’s plain language indicates Congress’s understanding 
that statutes of repose operate differently from statutes of 
limitations.  The language of Section 13 of the 1933 Act is where 
courts must primarily ascertain the scope of limitation Congress 
intended by the statute of repose.143  When congressional intent 
is clearly indicated by the text of the law in question, as it is in 
Section 13, courts must effectuate that meaning.144  Congress 
purposely inserted “[i]n no event shall any . . . action be brought 
 
137 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (“The broad remedial goals of the 
Securities Act are insufficient justification for interpreting a specific provision ‘more 
broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.’ ” (quoting 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
138 Id. at 653 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)) (“And the 
Court has recognized that Congress had ‘broad remedial goals’ in enacting the 
securities laws and providing civil remedies.” (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976))). 
139 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 
U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1985)). 
140 Id. 
141 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006). 
142 Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2010) (“ ‘[S]tatutory analysis 
necessarily begins with the plain meaning of a law’s text and, absent ambiguity, will 
generally end there.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Bustamante v. Napolitano, 
582 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
143 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 653 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
472 (1977)) (“The ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the scope of 
liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on 
the language of that section.”). 
144 Id. (“ ‘The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of 
whether this Court thinks [that] it can improve upon the statutory scheme that 
Congress enacted into law.’ ” (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 
578 (1979))). 
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to enforce a liability” for the statute of repose.145  Likewise, 
Congress chose to draft the statute of limitations, just a sentence 
prior, in a more subtle way, stating that “[n]o action shall be 
maintained to enforce any liability.”146  The use of different words 
in Section 13, specifically the more forceful language employed in 
the statute of repose, eliminates the ambiguity and expresses the 
intention that unlike the statute of limitations, the statute of 
repose is to be an absolute bar. 
Moreover, the primary tools of statutory analysis buttress 
the interpretation that Section 13’s statute of repose is not 
subject to the American Pipe doctrine.  Every word of Section 13 
is to be given effect.147  “In no event” would not be given its proper 
effect if in this event an action was permitted after the 
limitations period expires.148  Also, courts should not construe a 
statute in a way that would cause the statutory language to be 
superfluous.149  “Unless the ‘in no event more than three’ 
language cuts off claims of tolling and estoppel at three 
years . . . it serves no purpose at all . . . .”150  Accordingly, to 
interpret Section 13’s statute of repose not as an absolute bar 
would contradict the statute’s very purpose, ignore its plain text, 
and disregard the Supreme Court’s instruction on how to 
properly analyze a statute. 
Because the plain language of Section 13 expressly and 
unambiguously forbids the exact conduct that is sought by those 
wishing to benefit from the American Pipe doctrine, the statutory 
analysis should come to an end.  In the event that this logic is not 
persuasive enough, other principles of statutory interpretation  
 
 
145 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
146 Id. 
147 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)); accord Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
149 Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A] statute should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
150 Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990); see 
Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1301 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding “an 
interpretation that tolling principles should be applied to extend the three-year 
period of § 13 would . . . ignore the plain meaning of the language . . . ‘in no 
event’ . . . and defeat the very purpose of a statute of repose”). 
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support the conclusion that the American Pipe doctrine does not 
extend the period of time for which an individual claim or a 
motion to intervene must be commenced beyond three years. 
2. Congress Intended Section 13’s Statute of Repose To Operate 
as an Absolute Bar 
Allowing someone to intervene or file an individual suit after 
the uninterrupted repose period has run would undermine 
congressional intent.  The legislature’s purpose for enacting 
Section 13’s statute of repose reveals its nature as an absolute 
bar to claims brought after the date of repose.  The key purpose 
of a statute of repose is to provide a fixed and definite date for 
the quieting of litigation.151  Like statutes of repose in other 
contexts, Section 13’s statute of repose is “ ‘based on 
considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a 
whole’ ” and “ ‘a legislative balance of the respective rights of 
potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time 
limit beyond which liability no longer exists.’ ”152  Allowing 
actions to be brought after the three-year repose period would 
favor the rights of plaintiffs over those of defendants.  It would 
also run afoul of the certainty that Congress sought.  It is 
immaterial that some courts feel that the absolute bar may 
induce parties to file protective claims and potentially cause the 
needless multiplicity of suits that Rule 23 seeks to avoid because 
Congress, in passing Section 13, has already weighed these 
concerns and determined that to ensure stability of business, 
such causes of action need be extinguished despite whatever 
exigent circumstances or judicial inefficiencies may arise. 
The legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 also 
supports the conclusion that American Pipe should not apply to 
Section 13’s statute of repose.153  When the 1933 Act was first 
enacted, Section 13 initially contained a one- to ten-year 
structure within which the statute of limitations would be a one-
year period and the statute of repose would be a ten-year 
 
151 P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that a statute of repose is meant to provide parties, investors, and the business 
community with “an easily ascertainable and certain date for the quieting of 
litigation”). 
152 Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 701 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting First United 
Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865–66 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
153 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 & n.29 (1974). 
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limitation.154  In 1934, in reaction to criticism, Congress reduced 
the statute of repose to a three-year time limitation.155  The 
lingering liability concern had the effect of disrupting business 
dealings156 and the shorter repose period was intended to give 
greater assurance to corporations.157  Also, the concern that too 
long a window for a strict liability statute would discourage 
individuals from serving on boards of directors for fear of liability 
motivated this change.158  These qualms were met by the 1934 
amendments and addressed by the shortening of the repose 
period from ten to three years.159  If the statute of repose is not an 
absolute bar, the legislature’s concern for ongoing lawsuits would 
be blatantly ignored. 
3. The SEC’s Interpretation That Section 13’s Statute of Repose 
Is Absolute Should Carry Import 
Moreover, courts should defer to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) interpretation of Section 13’s 
statute of repose because of the SEC’s conferred power and 
expertise in dealing with the Act.  Courts addressing the issue 
have not made much reference to the SEC’s perspective on the 
matter despite the SEC’s authority to interpret the securities 
laws.160 
It is imperative that courts defer to the SEC’s interpretation 
of Section 13’s statute of repose.  In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the 
Supreme Court had to interpret the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) to determine what constituted “hours worked, for which 
 
154 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 13, 48 Stat. 74, 84 
(1933). 
155 78 CONG. REC. 8668 (1934) (responding to “criticisms and complaints which 
have come to the committee that the present act is too drastic, and is interfering 
with business,” Congress reduced the fixed repose period to three years in 1934) 
(remarks of Sen. Fletcher). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 10,186. 
158 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & 
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90-333), 1990 WL 10012716, at 
*28–29 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 8200 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Byrnes)) (expressing 
that an extended window would “ ‘deter [individuals] from serving on boards of 
directors’ because of fear of lingering liabilities” (alteration in original)). 
159 See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The legislative 
history in 1934 makes it pellucid that Congress included statutes of repose because 
of fear[s] that lingering liabilities would disrupt normal business and facilitate false 
claims. It was understood that the three-year rule was to be absolute.”). 
160 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2006). 
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overtime compensation [was] due.”161  The Court explained that 
Congress created the office of Administrator and imposed 
responsibilities upon it with respect to enforcement of the 
FLSA.162  Pursuant to its duties, the Administrator “has 
accumulated a considerable experience in the problems of 
ascertaining working time in employments.”163  In its Brief 
Amicus Curiae, the Administrator asserted that proper 
interpretation of the statute excluded sleeping and eating time of 
employees from the workweek and included all other on-call 
time.164  In drawing its conclusion, the Court stated that while 
“[t]here is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference 
courts should pay to the Administrator’s conclusions[,] . . . [t]his 
Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive 
weight to . . . other bodies that were not of adversary origin.”165  
The Court went on to explain that although the Administrator’s 
rulings, interpretations, and opinions are not controlling, they do 
represent experience and informed judgment to which courts 
appropriately may resort to for guidance.166  However, “[t]he 
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”167 
More recently in United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme 
Court affirmed and expanded upon the policy prescribed in 
Skidmore.168  In Mead, the issue was whether a three-ring binder 
with pages for daily schedules, phone numbers and addresses, a 
calendar, and so forth was a “diary” under the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States.169  Congress charged the United 
States Customs Service with classifying and fixing rates of 
imports.170  The Court had to determine what weight to give a 
 
161 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944). 
162 Id. at 137. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 139. 
165 Id. at 139–40. “The fact that the Administrator’s policies and standards are 
not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to 
respect.” Id. at 140. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
169 Id. at 218. 
170 Id. at 221–22. 
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Customs ruling letter in making its decision.171  The Court 
acknowledged that “it can still be apparent from the agency’s 
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances 
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with 
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in [a] statute.”172  
The Court emphasized that an agency’s interpretation, in 
whatever form it may appear, “may merit some 
deference . . . given the ‘specialized experience and broader 
investigations and information’ available to the agency, and 
given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial 
understandings of what a national law requires.”173  Ultimately, 
the Court afforded deference to the interpretation proffered by 
the Customs Service proportional to its “power to persuade.”174 
Accordingly, deference should be given to the SEC’s 
description of Section 13’s statute of repose.  In an amicus brief, 
the SEC confirmed that Section 13’s statute of repose bars all 
actions brought more than three years from the bona fide offering 
or sale of a security.  Congress created the SEC to enforce the 
securities laws, promote stability in the markets, protect 
investors, and granted the SEC broad authority to carry out its 
obligations.175  Specifically, one of the SEC’s primary 
responsibilities is to interpret the federal securities laws.176  In a 
brief submitted by the SEC as amicus curiae, the SEC explained 
that the three-year repose period reflects a congressional policy 
against allowing actions to be brought after the repose period has 
run so that potential defendants will not be subject to liabilities 
for indefinite periods.177  The SEC further explained that 
Congress established the relatively short periods for express 
 
171 See id. at 226. 
172 Id. at 229. 
173 Id. at 234 (citation omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
139–40 (1944)); see Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (finding 
that reasonable agency interpretations carry “at least some added persuasive force” 
where Chevron is inapplicable). 
174 Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
175 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); id. § 78d-1(a) (2006); SEC, 
supra note 31. 
176 See SEC, supra note 31. 
177 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158 (“[T]he outside period of 
repose in the 1933 and 1934 Act periods reflects a general congressional policy 
against tolling of securities claims . . . . This policy stems from the view that, if 
tolling is available, potential defendants will be subject to contingent liabilities for 
indefinite periods.”). 
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rights, such as those found in Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, 
because they are strict liability provisions.178  Given the SEC’s 
expertise enforcing the federal securities laws, its reasoned logic 
for interpreting the statute as it did, the consistency of the SEC’s 
interpretation with the legislative intent for enacting the statute 
of repose, and the thoroughness of the opinion set forth in its 
Amicus Brief, the SEC’s interpretation should be given deference 
by courts. 179  This deference, combined with the unambiguous 
statutory language and intent, should foreclose any finding that 
Section 13’s statute of repose is subject to the American Pipe 
doctrine. 
4. The Benefits of Section 13 Barring Actions After the Date of 
Repose Outweigh the Costs 
The interpretation of Section 13’s statute of repose as an 
absolute bar to actions brought after expiration of the 
uninterrupted three-year repose period results in the most 
efficient use of judicial resources.  To allow investors with large 
individual claims to take a wait-and-see approach with respect to 
the class action without having to decide whether to opt out or 
join the class would significantly hinder settlement 
negotiations.180  Furthermore, the uncertainty with respect to 
class size and number of opt-outs will make it difficult for parties 
to effectively negotiate settlements.181  Also, the likelihood of a 
settlement, which promotes greater judicial economy by resolving 
disputes outside of the courtroom, is increased by requiring early 
decisions to be made by unnamed class members. 
Moreover, forcing plaintiffs to decide whether to have their 
rights represented by the class action or to file individual claims 
before expiration of the statute of repose period best serves the 
interests of judicial economy and efficiency.  Whether or not more 
suits are filed for protective purposes, these suits will be decided 
much earlier than if the American Pipe doctrine allowed actions 
to be brought long after the repose period extinguished. 
 
178 Id. 
179 See id. at 28–30. 
180 Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland at 18–19, Footbridge Ltd. 
Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 11-1158 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 
4735347. 
181 Id. at 19. 
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The inefficiencies caused by not allowing actions to be 
brought after the three-year repose period are overshadowed by 
the inefficiencies that would result if American Pipe did modify 
Section 13’s statute of repose.  While it is acknowledged that 
applying Section 13 as an absolute bar may result in a 
multiplicity of lawsuits being filed as protective measures, this 
concern, in practicality, is overstated for three reasons. 
First, protective actions will be filed by unnamed class 
members in only limited circumstances.  Protective actions will 
be filed only when claims are subject to a statute of repose and 
the class certification motion has not yet been decided as the 
repose limitation period draws near.182  In addition, those 
choosing to file their own protective claims would have to be 
aware of their rights and have enough of an individual interest to 
motivate them to pursue a claim on their own.  As discussed, 
most individual investors have only minimal damages and it 
would not prove cost-effective to bring an individual claim. 
Second, plaintiffs, in conjunction with their lawyers, govern 
the nature of the suit they wish to bring.183  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure demand that class certification be determined at 
“an early practicable time” after the commencement of an 
action.184  In essence, plaintiffs control the timing at which class 
certification is determined, based on the adequacy of their claim 
of being a class.  Therefore, it is in the plaintiff’s control whether 
or not the three-year repose period becomes a concern. 
Third, the inefficiency feared by plaintiffs having to file 
protective suits can be mitigated by procedures already 
commonly used to manage class actions.185  Opt-out actions can 
be consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the U.S. Judicial 
Panel for Multidistrict Litigation,186 and motions to intervene, at 
the court’s discretion, can be deferred pending class certification 
decisions.187 
 
182 Id. at 16–17. 
183 Id. at 17; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
184 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
185 Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland, supra note 180, at 17. 
186 Id. at 18; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
187 Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland, supra note 180, at 18. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note reveals that the American Pipe doctrine, 
regardless of whether it is declared a tolling doctrine or not, 
cannot be applied to Section 13’s statute of repose so as to permit 
claimants to bring individual claims or motions to intervene after 
the repose period has run.  The statute as written operates as an 
absolute bar to any action brought after the uninterrupted three-
year repose period extinguishes and is not subject to any doctrine 
that modifies its limitation period.  The statute’s plain language, 
its legislative intent, the SEC’s interpretation of the statutory 
text, and the policy interest of finality in the business arena, all 
point toward this conclusion.  It is understood that Congress can 
legislate in order to permit the conduct that the statute of repose 
presently prohibits.  In the absence of legislative action, however, 
Section 13 of the 1933 Act must be given its absolute and 
uninhibited effect. 
 
